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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 
Unless the injury arises out of one or more of the exceptions to waivers set 
forth in Section 63-30-10, immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for 
any injury caused by a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway, 
road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other struc-
ture located on them. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proxi-
mately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the 
scope of employment except if the injury arises out of: 
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused. 
In determining whether or not an action is discretionary, a four-part test 
applies as articulated in Little v. Utah State Division of Family Services, 657 P.2d 49,51 
(Utah 1983). 
(1) Does the challenged act, omission, or decision necessarily involve a 
basic governmental policy, program, or objective? 
(2) Is the questioned act, omission, or decision essential to the realization 
or accomplishment of that policy, program, or objective as opposed to one 
which would not change the course or direction of the policy, program, or 
directive? 
(3) Does the act, omission, or decision require the exercise of basic policy 
evaluation, judgment, and expertise on the part of the governmental agency 
involved? 
(4) Does the governmental agency involved possess the requisite consti-
tutional, statutory, or lawful authority and duty to do or make the chal-
lenged act, omission, or decision? 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DOREEN B. THOMPSON, as Conservator 
for the estate of THEODORE BARRETT 
THOMPSON, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
RANDALL M. SMART, LEON GLENN, JR., 
CARMA W. GLENN, THE LEON GLENN, 
JR. TRUST, LEON GLENN, as Trustee, 
THE CITY OF HURRICANE, a municipal 
corporation, the STATE OF UTAH, and 
JOHN DOES 1 through X, 
Respondents. 
REPLY BRIEF 
REPLY TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant Hurricane City's characterization of the facts merits some 
attention, and Plaintiff therefore responds to Defendant Hurricane City's Statement of 
Facts as follows: 
1. In its characterization of the facts, Defendant Hurricane City makes no 
small issue of Barry Thompson's comparative negligence. See Respondent's Brief, at 3, 
Tl 3,4. In doing so, however, Hurricane City fails to understand the nature of this 
appeal. This is not an appeal of a jury verdict in which a jury found Barry Thompson 
more than 49% at fault for his injuries. The issues of this appeal focus on whether 
Defendant Hurricane City owes a duty of care to Barry Thompson. The legal question 
of duty must first be resolved before any argument of Barry Thompson's negligence 
Reply Brief 
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pagel 
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Priority No. 11 
can be made. Ironically, by asserting and focusing on Barry Thompson's negligence in 
its Statement of Facts as Hurricane City does, it implicitly concedes that it has a duty of 
care to Barry Thompson.1 
2. Defendant Hurricane City incorrectly implies that Plaintiff concedes 
Hurricane City owes no duty to maintain the roadway where Barry Thompson was 
injured. See Responsive Brief at 4 n.l. By statute, Hurricane City had a duty to 
maintain that portion of the roadway where the loose horse was. See Utah Code Ann. 
§27-12-88 (2). Further, Hurricane City has a common law duty to keep all streets within 
its municipal boundaries in a reasonable safe condition of travel, which common law 
duty has not been abrogated by statute. See Trapp v. Salt Lake City Corp., 835 P.2d 161 
(Utah 1992). Contrary to what Defendant Hurricane City suggests, Plaintiff merely 
conceded that because no prior reports of loose animals had been verified through 
discovery as were originally suspected by Plaintiff when filing the Complaint, 
Hurricane City did not have a duty to erect signs to warn against the danger of estray 
animals on its roadways. R. at 610-611. 
3. Finally, Defendant Hurricane City suggests that Plaintiff believes 
Defendant Hurricane City is liable for failure to enforce its ordinances in general. See 
Responsive Brief, Statement of Facts, *J[ 8. Defendant misunderstands Plaintiff's 
argument. Plaintiff explained this point in her Responsive Memorandum submitted to 
the trial court: 
With respect to the second duty alleged [Hurricane 
City's duty to enforce it's ordinances], Plaintiff 
maintains that Hurricane City does have the duty to 
ensure that domesticated animals do not run at large on 
Reply Brief 
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1
 Further, statements made by Barry Thompson about what he may have done just before the accident 
are irrelevant and incompetent. They are irrelevant because Barry Thompson has no recollection of what 
happened prior to the accident. His statements are pure speculation. See Record ("R.") at 1045 (Barry 
Thompson depo. at 4). They are incompetent because Barry Thompson was in a coma for three weeks 
immediately following the accident and suffers permanent neurological damage. R. at 1046 (Barry 
Thompson depo. at 5). The very nature of these proceedings is that of conservatorship in behalf of Barry 
Thompson. See Addendum. 
or about the streets of Hurricane City. Hurricane City is 
obligated by its own ordinance to perform this function. 
See Hurricane City Ordinance, §§13-212,13-221,13-240(3), 
13-241,13-242,13-247. See also Argument, Part II. More 
specifically, however, Plaintiff maintains that Hurricane 
City had a duty to Barry Thompson to respond to an 
emergency situation once it knew of the same and took 
affirmative steps to prevent Barry Thompson's accident. 
See Complaint, f 28. Defendant Hurricane City 
breached its duty when it failed to take steps that would 
have mitigated Barry Thompson's injuries, which steps 
would have been taken had the conduct of Hurricane City 
and its agents been consistent with that of a reasonably prudent 
person. Certainly this more specific duty of care was plead 
given the facts alleged and the general concept of notice 
pleading. (Footnote omitted). 
R. at 611-612. 
Further, Plaintiff's citations to the Hurricane City ordinance are not in support 
of a theory that Hurricane City is liable solely on the basis of its own ordinance. As the 
New York Court of Appeals explained: 
The Plaintiff is not seeking to hold the Defendant's liable as 
insurers for failing to protect a member of the general public 
from a criminal act of which they were not aware but should 
have anticipated and prevented. He is not urging that there 
should be a police officer on every corner or at every place 
where a crime is likely to occur, (citations omitted) 
DeLong v. County of Erie, 60 N.Y.2d 296,305,457 N.E. 2d 717 (1983). Rather, Plaintiff 
relies on Hurricane City's ordinances to argue (1) that Hurricane City was capable of 
removing the loose horse once it was aware of the situation — which by its own 
admission was a situation posing imminent danger to highway travellers and was a 
high priority item to be corrected, See Appellant's Brief at 7, % 16 - (2) that by virtue of 
the ordinance and the duties imposed upon Hurricane City's Police Department and 
Animal Control, which entities are one and the same, it was a common practice for 
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Hurricane City towns people to contact the Hurricane City Police Department through 
Virginal Pectol, the Town Clerk, to report large animals roaming about within 
Hurricane City's municipal boundaries, and (3) that it is not an excessive leap of 
reasoning to suppose that once the loose animal had been reported to the proper 
authorities, neighbors and towns people would leave removal of the street hazard to the 
Police. See Appellant's Brief, Statement of Facts, Jf 3-18. 
Moreover, the fact that under the Hurricane City Ordinance, a person charged 
with responsibility for the loose animal was strictly liable for damages caused by the 
animal, and that under the ordinance, as written, the Hurricane City Pound master or 
Chief of Police was a person charged with responsibility for the animal is of 
consequence primarily to Plaintiff's third argument: the Hurricane City Ordinance was 
designed to protect a particular class of persons, similar to the reasonably identifiable 
group of persons likely to incur harm as described in Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P. 2d 1156, 
1163,1164 (Utah 1989). The ordinance was designed to keep stray animals off of 
Hurricane City's streets to prevent the very kind of harm that Barry Thompson suffered. 
This argument comes into play as an exception to the public duty doctrine. See 
Appellant's Brief at 23. The Hurricane City Ordinance is part of the record. See R. at 
860-877. Plaintiff has not used selected portions of that ordinance to mislead this 
Court. All inferences made flow effortlessly from a plain reading of the Ordinance. 
Having clarified the facts, Plaintiff now proceeds to argue the law. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
HURRICANE CITY HAD A DUTY TO BARRY THOMPSON 
INDIVIDUALLY TO REMOVE THE LOOSE HORSE FROM HURRICANE 
CITY'S STREETS, WHICH DUTY ARISES UNDER THE CITY'S COMMON 
LAW DUTY TO MAINTAIN ITS STREETS IN A REASONABLY SAFE 
CONDITION OF TRAVEL. 
As articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in Trapp v. Salt Lake City Corp., 
835 P.2d 161 (Utah 1992), a city has a non-delegable duty to maintain its streets in 
a reasonably safe condition for travel. Id. at 161; see also Ingram v. Salt Lake City, 733 
P.2d 126,127 (Utah 1987). Defendant Hurricane City argues that this duty does not 
apply in the present case because the hazard was placed on its streets by a third party 
and because a horse is not a "physical facility." Responsive Brief at 23-25. Munici-
palities are, however, liable for the acts of third parties in creating dangers on city 
streets if the municipality had notice of the danger. 
The fact that the defect or obstruction in a street is the result of an 
act of a third person, other than representatives or employees of 
the municipality, does not relieve the municipality from liability 
therefor. The law is settled that where the duty is imposed by 
statute or charter upon municipal corporations to use ordinary 
care to keep the public ways in a reasonably safe condition for 
travel, or where the obligation is recognized by law, the fact that the 
defect, obstruction or danger in such ways, resulting in injury, 
was due to the act or omission of a third person does not necessarily 
relieve the municipality of liability therefor; and this is so regard-
less of the want of consent of the municipality, or the possibility 
that third persons themselves may be liable. However, the municipality 
must have had actual knowledge of the defective condition, or was 
chargeable with notice thereof by lapse of time or otherwise, before the 
accident. 
When the defect is caused by a third person, the negligence for 
which the municipality is liable is not the creation of the defect, 
but instead the negligence in failing to remove or guard the defect 
Reply Brief 
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after actual or constructive notice thereof. The fact that the 
municipality itself did not construct the street or sidewalk 
which was the cause of injury does not exonerate it. 
This rule applies, inter alia, to defects or obstructions caused 
by the acts of abutting owners, occupants of property bordering 
on a public way, and independent contractors 
(Footnotes omitted, emphasis supplied) 
19E. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 54.43 (Revised 1985). 
Hurricane City is liable for the acts of third parties creating a danger on its 
streets if it had actual or constructive notice of the danger because Hurricane City 
maintains its streets as "trustee for the use and benefit of the public." Beach v. City of 
Phoenix, 667 P. 2d 1327,1328 (Ariz. App. 1982) (McFate, J., dissenting). Hurricane City 
was not simply a landlord of and Barry Thompson an invitee on the City's public 
streets. Id. 
If Hurricane City is aware of a hazard on its streets, "it occupies the same 
position as [the par ty] . . . originally responsible for placing it there." Id. at 1329. 
Given the admission of Hurricane City's principal agents that they were aware of the 
loose horse, its location on Hurricane City municipal streets, and that the loose horse on 
its streets posed imminent danger to motorists like Barry Thompson and was a high 
priority item to be corrected, see Appellant's Brief, Statement of Facts, Tl 12-16, 
further, given Hurricane City's concession that Virginia Pectol, the Town Clerk, could 
have done more to remedy the situation than what she did and that had she done so her 
conduct would have made a difference, see Appellant's Brief, Statement of Facts, % 18, 
Hurricane City cannot now excuse itself from liability because it did not place the horse 
on its streets. 
In addition, Hurricane City is mistaken if it supposes the loose horse is the 
"physical facility" to be controlled. See Respondent's Brief at 23 - 25. Hurricane City's 
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di it}/ is not to maintai i i the horse in a reasonably good rumi ing condition; its di ity is "to 
maintain [its] physical facilities, or more specifically, to keep [its] sidewalks and streets 
in a reasonably safe condition," Trapp , 835 P.2d at 161. This duty to keep its streets 
reasor i,ably safe is "groi i nde< :i i lpoi i the • :on i 1:1 101 i lai v p i :i ncipal that - ol 
over a physical facility has an obligatioi L to keep it in [a] safe conditioi . - . x c 
set forth in / ;tt!r r Utah State Div. of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983), if the 
g> »\ -. * •" \anages < "1 " " " vl * j Jc: l "l u::" area in • •* "' "ri" ;l "!|i I • « r";i A :iii • i ,,:v ' c " rii ired i i i tl i is 
case irs streets—it is liable for
 !t- icu i«. s injuries it it - >ch; . -i^e ui M'u- danger and the 
injuries are directly and proximately caused by the government's negligent failure to 
remedy tl teproblen L Id at 51; see also I t i / vim i i ! lit ih State Dept ofTrai is, 823 P.2d535, 
540 n. 5. 
If - v,fb; * consequence that the hazard i^  th, . H u . > ? - ambulatory 
horse ra nit . . • *:: . - • orse 
increased its danger to motorists like Barry Thompson The argument that the horse is 
; Mi-- •» .v as a mitigating factor in assessing negligencei had 
Hurn^::ie Lity gone out to retrieve tl L :.une a^^ not fonnr - ^ negligence would ^e 
substantially reduced. Here, however. Hurricane L in :v . a e n r^.a/e J* out to ^ee 
w here tl ie horse i vas reported loose i •*. 
the horse. 
Again, McQuillin's treatise is helpful: 
The municipal duty to keep public ways reasonably safe for 
persons using them in the usual way ordinarily extends to 
such obstructions and hazards as actually impede the normal and 
reasonable use of such ways, whether such obstructions occur 
in the surface of the street or at some point above the surface. 
(emphasis supplied, footnotes omitted). 
19 E. McQuillin, The I aw of Municipal Corporations § 54.11 (Revised 1985). In si ipport 
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(Ariz. App. 1974) and Lowman v. City of Mesa, 611 P. 2d 943 (Ariz. App. 1980). See 19 E. 
McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 54.11 at 43. 
In Jensen v. Maricopa County, 522 P. 2d 1096 (Ariz. App. 1974), the Arizona 
Court of Appeals found Maricopa County liable for the Plaintiff's injuries when the 
Plaintiff hit a steer on an Arizona State Highway. On May 25,1971, at about 9:30 p.m., 
the Plaintiff, while riding a motorcycle, was injured when he struck a black steer. The 
affidavits and depositions submitted in connection with the County's motion for 
summary judgment established that at the time of the accident, the Plaintiff was 
travelling at approximately 40-45 miles per hour, that the Plaintiff was familiar with the 
area where the accident occurred, and that the Plaintiff knew cattle were confined in 
pens abutting the roadway. Id. at 1097; Compare R. at 405 (Barry Thompson depo. at 22-
23,29-30); R. at 1164 (Ted McCall depo. at 10). Plaintiff's theory was that because the 
County was aware of three previous animal related accidents within the past two years, 
the County was negligent in failing to warn of the possibility of cattle on the highway. 
Jensen, 522 P. 2d at 1097. The Trial Court granted the County's motion for summary 
judgment finding that the County had no duty to act. On appeal, the Arizona Court of 
Appeals reversed and stated: 
The duty of the County is to maintain its highways reasonably 
safe for travel. The municipal duty to keep public ways reasonably 
safe for persons using them in the usual way ordinarily extends 
to such obstructions and hazards as actually impede a normal and 
reasonable use of such ways. We believe the facts of this case 
are analogous to the situation where a third person creates an 
obstruction upon a highway. In such cases [,] the municipality 
can be liable for the obstruction caused by an abutting land 
owner when it has notice of the defect and fails to remove or warn 
of its existence. In order to charge the municipality with liability 
for such obstruction created by a third person, the municipality 
must have had actual notice of the condition or notice of such facts 
and circumstances as would, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, liave 
led a prudent person to such knowledge, (emphasis supplied, citations 
omitted). 
Reply Brief 
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Id. at 1097,1093. 
T h e Coi irt f ::: i i i id 1:1: Lat becai i se IV laricopa Coi iii,tiy 1 Lad coi i str i ictb ;,e i lotice of the 
danger posed by the loose steer, it had a duty to warn motorists of that danger, and its 
failure to warn Plaintiff was an actionable breach of negligence.2 Id. at 1098; see also 
Lawman v. Lity of Me^i, r.II I" A;l (M'JP "LMD [At w *ipp KSii). 3 
A governmental entity must either adequately warn of a known danger on its 
streets < >:r ren LOV e tl: te danger State v. Kaliio, 557 P. 2d 705, 706 (Nev. 1976). In Kallw, the 
Nevada Supreme Court affirmed a jury finding the State of Nevada negligent in 
keeping its highways reasonably safe for travel In doing so, the Nevada Supreme 
Coi :i rt said: 
The State first contends it cannot be liable for Kallio's injuries. 
However the State has a duty to exercise due care to keep its 
highways reasonably safe for the travelling public. Inherent 
in this duty of care is the alternative duty to either remedy a known 
hazardous condition on its highways or give appropriate warningof 
its presence, (emphasis supplied, citations omitted) 
Reply Brief 
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2
 In Jensen, after the Court found the County owed a duty to the Plaintiff, the County argued that 
because it was in the shoes of the cattle owner who was absolved of liability under Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 24-502, the County came within the statutes' protection and was not liable to the Plaintiff. The Court of 
Appeals found, however, that though the statute was a defense for the cattle owner, the County's duty to 
maintain its streets was "not co-extensive" with an owner's duty to keep his animal off the road, and the 
Appellant Court found that the statute did not absolve the County. Jensen, 522 P.2d at 1098. The Jensen 
Courts' ruling that Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann., § 24-502 absolved the cattle owner's liability was overturned by 
the Arizona Supreme Court in Carrow Co. v. Lusby, 804 P.2d 747, 751 (Ariz. 1990) (en banc). 
3
 In Loman, the Plaintiff was injured when she collided with a vehicle that was abandoned on the streets 
of the City of Mesa. The City argued that it owed only a general duty to the public to keep its streets in a 
reasonably safe condition of travel. The Arizona Court of Appeals disagreed: 
In this case, the Mesa City Code § 10-3-29(A)(3) authorizes the city police to remove 
unattended vehicles the presence of which constitutes a hazard. Any 
duty of the police by virtue of the code to remove such a vehicle is one 
owed to the public generally and the failure of the police to remove a 
vehicle in violation of this duty would not ordinarily give rise to liability 
to a member of the public injured by the failure to remove it. However, 
the City has a common law duty owed to all users of City streets to keep 
them reasonably safe for travel and to warn the users of any actual dangers 
known to the City or which should be known to the City in the exercise of 
reasonable care. It is an alleged breach of this duty which Appellant is entitled 
to have considered by the trier of fact, (emphasis in original, footnotes omitted) 
Id. at 946. 
Kallio, 557 P.2d at 706. The Plaintiff in Kallio hit an unbranded horse on a 
state highway approximately 5 miles north of Winnemucca, Nevada. Some time before 
the accident, the State of Nevada and the Federal BLM built a range control fence 
running parallel to the highway that blocked a natural game crossing over the highway. 
Because horses could not cross the fence, they occasionally were found running about 
or near the state highway. The Nevada Supreme Court found that the loose animals on 
the road created a danger to motorists about which the State of Nevada was aware on 
account of previous animal-motorists collisions. Because the State of Nevada did not 
remove the danger after it had notice of its existence, the State was properly liable for 
Plaintiffs injuries. Id. at 706. 
Contrary to what Defendant Hurricane City may suggest, the physical facility 
it is to maintain is the roadway within its municipal boundaries. It has a duty to either 
remove a known hazard or to adequately warn of the hazard's presence. Further, this 
duty is not abrogated by the fact that the hazard was placed on the road by third 
parties. Maricopa County did not place the black steer on its county road. Jensen, 
522 P.2d at 1097. That steer was on the road because of its owner's negligence. 
Similarly, the State of Nevada was responsible for a known hazard on its highways that 
was in part created by the BLM's range control fence. Kallio, 557 P. 2d at 706. The issue 
is not how the hazard got on the road or what the hazard is. The issue is whether first a 
hazard existed on the road making it unsafe for the road's intended use, and whether 
the governmental entity had reasonable notice of the hazard in order to correct it. 
Given that Hurricane City officials knew the loose horse in this case created a danger to 
motorists like Barry Thompson, see Appellant's Brief, Statement of Facts, \ \ 12-16, and 
given Hurricane City's concession that for purposes of summary judgment, this Court 
can assume Hurricane City could have done more in the approximate hour after 
receiving notice of the loose horse to remedy the hazard than what it did and that had it 
done so, its conduct would have made a difference in the accident of Barry Thompson, 
see Appellant's Brief, Statement of Facts, \ 18, the trial court committed plain error in 
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( ) eric x )1 ingtl i n ; the* >i } • ) f l i it i lit;; > „ ?eeR at 781 785, 7884 788- 790 , u u I n iling that 
Hurricane City owed no duty to Barry Thompson, effectively insulating the negligence 
of Hurricane O r v in maintaining a street that is under its control. The effect of this 
"1 Hi Lg is till: ii till: - - ipalit ; may stand b;; - vv ith i n i/pi in it) v\ I: i i le knowii ig a serioi is 
danger exists on its streets. Such a rul ing does not promote sound public policy. 
POINT II 
UTAH LAW IMPOSES A SPECIAL DUTY OF CARE UPON A 
MUNICIPALITY IF (1) THE PLAINTIFF IS A MEMBER OF AN 
IDENTIFIABLE GROUP LIKELY TO.INCUR HARM, A N D (2) THE 
MUNICIPALITY UNDERTOOK AFFIRMATIVE STEPS TO REMEDY A 
KNOWN DANAGER; DETRIMENTAL RELIANCE O N THE PART OF THE 
PLAINTIFF IS UNNECESSARY 
A.s stated in Plaintiffs Opening Brief, this ca>e > < >; one of mere non-
feasance III! • . k e I ah 1 v i 1 he Citj ' i nth is case i \ as 
aware of the specific danger. >ee Appellant's Brief at % lb, atia compare LaMarr v, Utah 
State Prri of Trans., 828 P.2d 535,540 (Utah App. 1992). Hurricane City took the report 
• -* ,!• -. -< -:- id tl te persoi L 
delivered the message to Hurricane C * > Miat Hurricane <- ir vould take care of the 
problem, made several efforts to contact its agents responsible for remc>\ ing the horse, 
n appar* . >; 
K it !4> '-14M H*:- cane Ot\ undertook to remedy a kno\ :• Ma/^ra --n its streets and 
assumed a duty of care. 
Moreover, there is nothing ironic by the fact that the Lity incurs ..u .,,:. by 
partially or negligently acting when it might have been immune from liability ha. ^ 
done i L atl i i i ig See Respondent's Brief at 19. That is the very distinction between 
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 On June 29,1992, Plaintiff submitted to the Trial Court without objection, a Supplemental 
Memorandum arguing Hurricane City's duty to maintain its streets. The Supplemental Memorandum 
was submitted 14 days prior to the hearing on Hurricane City's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Defendant Hurricane City did not submit a Reply Memorandum to either Appellant's Responsive 
Memorandum or Appellant's Supplemental Memorandum. 
misfeasance and nonfeasance. The law imposes a duty of care upon the good Samaritan 
who negligently acts. See generally W. Prosser, The Law of Torts § 56 (4th ed. 1971). 
Many courts recognize that a governmental entity cannot cloak itself in the robes of the 
public duty doctrine if it undertook to remedy a known harm and was negligent in its 
undertaking. That is the rescue exception to the public duty doctrine. See Bailey v. Town 
of Forks, 737 P.2d 1257,1260 (Wash. 1987) (en banc) (a recognized exception to the public 
duty doctrine exists when a governmental entity fails to exercise reasonable care after 
assuming a duty to act).5 
In addition, this duty assumed was not merely to the public generally. Barry 
Thompson was a member of a reasonably identifiable group likely to incur harm. He 
was a person or a member of a distinct group of persons that Hurricane City "knew or 
should have known" would have been harmed were the loose horse allowed to run on 
the municipality's public streets. See Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156,1162 (Utah 1991). 
He was one of a few people exposed to the dangers of a loose horse on Hurricane City's 
streets at the approximate location of the horse. 
Further, the Rollins Court made it clear that detrimental reliance on the part of 
the victim was not a prerequisite for liability under the special relationship exception to 
the public duty doctrine. The entire thrust of Rollins was that it was unreasonable to 
require the State to second guess where a loose mental patient might recklessly drive a 
stolen car. For that reason, the Court defined the reasonably identifiable group likely to 
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5
 The Bailey case is one in which the Washington Supreme Court found the Town of Forks liable for 
failing to keep a drunken motorist off the road after a police officer was aware of the motorist's intoxi-
cated state and did nothing to prevent and to enforce the state's drunken driving laws. It should be noted 
that Defendant Hurricane City relies on Christensen v. Hayward for the proposition that a city owes only a 
general duty to the public to arrest drunk drivers and to enforce state drunken driving laws. The 
Christensen Court, however, specifically excepted cases like Bailey: 
The authorities cited by Plaintiff concern cases of injury to third parties by a driver who 
was drunk and who was not arrested by an officer who had reason to believe him drunk. Those 
cases are strangers to the facts alleged here and are without dispositive force. 
Christensen, 649 P.2d at 613. 
incur harm. The Court did not require that members of that g roup communicate wi th 
the Stati A^C receive son i,„e assurai ice of 1 Lelp I i at ] 1 62 
The issue in this case is whether Hurricane City under took sufficient steps to 
remedy Barry Thompson 's situation si ich that it assumed a du ty of care to Barry 
Thompson or persons in his similar situatioi i,„. I lai i i,,t,iff coi itei i„„cis Hu rri :ai te City "s 
u tions were sufficient for an assumpt ion of du ty because: 
(111 ) I lit in icai le City had ordinances specifically prohibiting loose 
animals fton i running about its streets, and set up an animal control 
division within its police department to enforce those laws. See Appellant's 
Brief at 2, tl uroi lgl L6 
(2) Members in the community were aware that Hurricane City's 
Animal Control removed stray animals and that communication with 
I !i irri cai ie Cit y "s X i i i mal Coi Ltrol c : i i 1 :i tal :„e place tin rough contacting 
Virginia Pectol at the City Offices. See Appellant's Brief at 3, 6. 
Approximately 45 minutes to an hour before the accident, some-
OT • \ 
Barry Thompson, and Virginia Pectol indicated to them that the situation 
would be taken care of. See Appellant's Brief at 5. 
(4) Virginia Pectol did in fact n Lake several attempts to coi ttact 
Hurricane City's Animal Control, but was daunted by the Animal Control 
Officer's failure to respond to the phone and radio. (See Appellant's Brief 
at 
* ? Hurricane City officials and the chief of police, who was in fact 
~ if the Animal Control Officer, were immediately accessible to 
Virginia Pectol by telephone, by interoffice intercom, by radio dispatch, 
and by her walking 30 feet down the hall to the office of the chief of police. 
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See Appellant's Brief at 5,6. 
(6) Hurricane City recognized that a loose horse on its highway 
posed imminent danger to motorists and was a high-priority item to be 
corrected, and Hurricane City had a duty to keep its streets safe for public 
travel. See Appellant's Brief at 7. 
(7) Finally, Hurricane City has conceded for purposes of its Motion 
for Summary Judgment that it could have done more than what it did to 
remove the horse, and that had it done more, the accident may not have 
happened. See Appellant's Brief at 7. 
Had Hurricane City remained unaware of the imminent danger on its streets, 
and had Hurricane City taken no action whatsoever to remedy the danger, it may not 
have had a duty of care to Barry Thompson because of the public duty doctrine. Under 
the facts of this case, however, Hurricane City's conduct constituted misfeasance, and 
the degree of Hurricane City's negligence must be submitted to a jury. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to reverse the lower court's ruling 
granting Hurricane City's Motion for Summary Judgment because Hurricane City owed 
a duty of care to Barry Thompson to keep its streets reasonably safe, because Hurricane 
City owed a duty to Barry Thompson to remove the horse because it assumed a duty to 
act when confronted with a known danger to an identifiable group of persons, and 
because Hurricane City's ordinances were designed to protect people like 
Barry Thompson and Hurricane City had a duty to act under its own ordinance. 
DATED this day of , 1993. 
SNOW & JENSEN 
V. Lowry Snow 
Lewis P. Reece 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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V. Lowry Snow [3030] 
SNOW & JENSEN 
Attorney for Petitioner 
150 North 200 East, Suite 203 
P.O. Box 2747 
St. George, UT 84771-2747 
Telephone (801) 628-3688 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate ] 
of ; 
THEODORE BARRY THOMPSON, ; 
a protected person. ] 
> APPOINTMENT OF 
> CONSERVATOR 
) Probate No. 913500055 
Upon consideration of the Verified Petition for Appointment of Conser-
vator filed by Doreen B. Thompson on the 8th day of April, 1991, the Court finds, 
upon hearing, that a qualified person as petitioned for appointment as conservator 
of the estate of the above protected person, that venue is proper, that required 
notices were given or waived, that all requirements for appointment under the 
Uniform Probate Code have been met, and that the best interest and welfare of the 
protected person will be served by appointment of Doreen B. Thompson as conser-
vator of the estate of Theodore Barry Thompson. 
THEREFORE, Doreen B. Thompson is hereby appointed conservator of 
the estate of Theodore Barry Thompson, to act without bond, and upon qualifi-
cation and acceptance, letters of conservatorship shall be issued to the said conser-
^ MP 
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vator. 
DATED this 2^r- day of , 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
lilip Eves 
>istrict Judge 
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